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Abstract: 
 
In general, this research is aimed at providing empirical evidence concerning the analysis of 
the adoption of IFRS as a moderating variable in the relation of corporate governance with 
earnings management. In particular,  there are two objectives in this research, first, to 
provide empirical evidence concerning the analysis of the adoption of IFRS as a moderating 
variable in the relation between the independent of commissioners to the number of board of 
commissioners and earnings management; second, to analyze the adoption of IFRS as a 
moderating variable in  the relation between the dual position audit committee members and 
earnings management.  
The research was conducted on companies listed on the Stock Exchanges of Germany, 
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands from 2002 to 2013. It primarily employed agency 
theory. Moreover, it employed primary variables including adoption of IFRS, corporate 
governance, in particular the proportion of independent commissioners to the board of 
commissioners, dual positions of audit committee members and earnings management.  
The test results in this research conclude that: the results of testing of the model of accrual 
earnings management with the samples of companies listed on the stock exchanges of 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Denmark indicated that the adoption of IFRS 
strengthened negative relation of the proportion of independent commissioners to the number 
of board of commissioners with accruals earnings management, so that the hypothesis 1 was 
acceptable. The hypothesis 2 stating the adoption of IFRS strengthen negative relation 
between the multi position of audit committee members and accrual earnings management 
was acceptable.  
Keywords: Board of Commissioners, Independent Commissioners, Audit Committee, 
Adoption of IFRS, Accrual Earnings Management.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Faculty of Economic and Business, Lampung University-Indonesia, E-
mail:agriantiksa@gmail.com 
Implementation the International Financial Reporting Standards  as a Moderating Variable 
of the Relationship of Corporate Governance with Earnings Management 
 
260 
 
Introduction 
 
Issue elevated on this study is the impact of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) implementation that uses proper value in assessing assets and 
liabilities as moderating variable between corporate governance and auditor quality 
with earnings management. The objectives of this study is to provide empirical 
evidence of the impact of IFRS implementation as moderating of relationship 
between corporate governance on earnings management. The crisis of finance in 
2007 and 2008 provides clear picture on many companies that reports the declining 
of market value of company’s assets. The assessment of company’s assets based on 
market value may be directly affected from liquidity of low market price. This is 
resulting sense of skeptical of investor to perform investment named liquidity risk. 
Scott (2012), Kothari and Lester (2012), Khan (2010),  Allegret et al. (2016), 
Thalassinos et al. (2010), (2013), (2014), (2015), Boldeanu and Tache (2016), Fetai 
(2015) and Glavina (2015) state that the liquidity risk leads to market value lower 
than book value. According to Scott (2012) and Thalassinos and Politis (2011) and 
(2012),  the impact of using normal value when the liquidity is low the market price 
constitute main issue of normal values failure.   
 
According to Barth et at. (2008) there is earnings management decline in the 
company that voluntarily adopting IFRS between 1994 until 2003. The research of 
Daske and Gebhardt (2006) state that there is improvement of disclosure after IFRS 
implementation across countries that adopting IFRS. The result of the research of 
Barth et at. (2008) finds that company that adopts IFRS experiencing improvement 
of reporting quality such as earnings management decline, the acknowledgment of 
on time damage and incline of value relevance. Daske et al. (2008) indicates that 
adoption of IFRS proven the improvement of market liquidity, reducing capital cost 
of company and improve equity value. 
 
In contrary with the research result of Barth et al. (2008), other research that is 
performed by Christensen et al. (2008) its result indicates that the company in 
Germany after adopting IFRS experiencing decline of earnings management level. 
The decline of earnings management level mentioned earlier only for company as 
early adopter that has incentive to improve the transparency of reported profit rate. 
In relation to early adopter company, Christensen et al. (2008) find evidence that 
there is improvement in earnings management for company that is not implementing 
IFRS until IFRS becomes mandatory in Germany.  
 
Research result of Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) conclude that company 
adopting IFRS there is no indication of difference in the behavior of earnings 
management that is still implementing German accounting standards. The finding of 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) state that company adopting IFRS voluntarily 
in Germany cannot be associated with low earnings management. Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) find there is improvement of earnings management after 
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implementing IFRS in France but for Australia and England there is no improvement 
of earnings management. Ahmed et al. (2012) finds significant evidence that there is 
improvement of earnings management following relative IFRS adoption on control 
sample of company that is not adopting IFRS (the most comes from USA 
companies). Research of Ahmed et al. (2012) and Christensen et al. (2008) has 
different attribute for company that adopt IFRS earlier compared to sample company 
in Bart research et al. (2008).  
 
Earnings management is an intension action covering all kinds of manipulation that 
may affect financial reporting both through profit amount or other accountant item 
(Scott, 2012). Apart from the accrual discretionary quality, earnings management 
also measured by using real activity of company. Research of Roychowdhury (2006) 
examines earnings management through real activity initiative starting from normal 
operating practice that further is motivated to meet certain targets. There are motive 
variety of company to perform real earnings management vary. Research of Graham 
et al. (2005) indicates that there is availability of manager to change discretionary 
expenses as well as other real decisions to achieve the objectives of financial 
reporting.    
 
Some of researches examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings management indicate that there is negative relationship between the 
measurement of commissioner board and earnings management. Result of Klein 
research (2002) and Zéghal et al. (2011) indicate that there is negative relationship 
between independent commissioners with profit level management. Lacker et at. 
(2007) researching the relationship between discretionary accrual with commissioner 
of board measurement. Sivaramakrishnan and Shaokun (2008) researching the effect 
of governance corporate structure on accrual quality. The result indicates that if the 
mechanism of governance corporate runs well, then the profit quality is high and the 
company with adequate mechanism of governance tends to have high accrual 
quality.  
 
Scott (2012) states that the perspective of measurement on the financial reporting is 
an approach which emphasizes responsibility of the company to put normal value 
into financial reporting. There are three levels in determining normal price according 
to IFRS 13, first is an input in the form of price adopted from active market for an 
identical assets and liability. These prices must be applied as determining input of 
normal value without performing adjustment, in so far available. If it is excluded in 
the first level, then the second input level may be observed, directly or indirectly on 
assets and liability. The third level, if input can unobserved, including necessary 
adjusted company internal data to reflect assumptions on participant in the market.  
 
Mechanism function of corporate governance particularly board of commissioner 
and committee of audit in the company is providing supervision that is more to 
management performance and providing accurate information and appropriate 
toward the financial reporting of the company. After its prevailing of proper value in  
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assets assessment in IFRS application since 2005, it is expected that the application 
of IFRS strengthens the role of corporate governance in influencing the integrity of 
financial reporting. Based on that, questions of research submitted are as follows:  
Does the application of IFRS strengthen the negative corporate governance with  
earnings management?    
 
This research is motivated by some previous researches which was the research of 
Bart et at. (2008), Capkun et al. (2008) and the research of Doukakis (2014). The 
research result of Barth et al. (2008) states that there is declining of earnings 
management in the company which voluntarily adopts IFRS between 1994 until 
2003. Capkun et al. (2008) states that there is high earnings management in 2005 
due to the adjustment of accounting standards of local accounting standards to IFRS. 
Doukakis (2014) with the range of data of 2000-2010 states that there is no accrual 
and real earnings management differences after IFRS is applied. 
 
Previous research indicated there was relationship between corporate governance 
characteristic and auditor quality in reducing earnings management occurred in 
public company (Klein 2002; Beasley 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 
2007; Dechow et al., 1996 and Chtourou et al., 2001). The research of Marra et al. 
(2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011) research the influence of corporate governance and 
auditor quality toward earnings management in the period before and after the 
application of IFRS 2002-2010. 
 
The different research of Marra et al. (2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011) with the 
previous research is using the application of IFRS as moderating of role of 
commissioner board and audit committee in reducing earnings management. Marra 
et al. (2011) specifically elevate issue of corporate governance in performing new 
accounting standards, due after application of IFRS the role of corporate governance 
and auditor quality are expected to be more effective in declining the level of 
earnings management. The application of IFRS that becomes main issue in this 
research, refers to previous research which is more focus on the setting that is exist 
in Europe, such as some researches that had performed by Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), Capkun et al. (2011), Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Daske et al. 
(2008), Christensen et al. (2008), Marra et al. (2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011). This 
is due to the application of IFRS is applicable earlier in some big parts of Europe 
countries. 
 
This study develops Marra’s research et al. (2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011) who 
perform research on the influence of IFRS as moderating variable of relationship 
between corporate governance with earnings management. Marra et al. (2011) 
performs research in Italia in the period of research 2003-2006, while Zéghal et al. 
(2011) perform research in France with the same research period with Marra et al. 
(2011). The research result of Marra et al. (2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011) indicate 
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that corporate governanceis more effective to lower the earnings management after 
IFRS being applied. 
 
This study elevates issue of the role of corporate governance in reducing earnings 
management which moderated by the application of IFRS particularly addressed to 
countries that implementing two-tier  model in the structure model of its corporate 
governance. The research is performed with the enhancement of study in the initial 
adopters of IFRS and as countries that apply corporate governance two-tier are The 
Netherland, Germany, Denmark, and France. This study is different than the 
research of  Marra et al. (2011) that only perform the study only in Italia. Marra et 
al. (2011) only researches on companies in one country that has only corporate 
governance one tier model.  
 
The purpose of this research generally is to provide empirical evidence on analysis 
of application of IFRS as moderating variable of governance corporate relationship 
with earnings management. The result of this study is expected may provide 
empirical, practical and methodological contributions for academicians, regulators 
and communities. Empirical contribution expected may be provided by this study is 
presenting additional empirical evidence on analysis of application of IFRS may 
strengthen negative relationship between corporate governance with earnings 
management before and after the IFRS application period particularly for countries 
with corporate governance two-tier model. Using special sample for countries with 
corporate governance two-tier model due to different structure corporate governance 
model according to Othman and Zéghal (2006) will have behavior consequences in 
performing different earnings management.  
 
This study particularly refers to the countries adopting IFRS and structure of two-tier 
council follower. This is intended to provide empirical contribution for the 
regulators in Indonesia due to the companies in Indonesia using the structure of two-
tier council and Indonesia in 2012 begins to apply IFRS. Methodology contribution 
expected that may be provided on this study is the use of proxy of double post that 
perform by audit committee member that involves in the structure of corporate 
governance with other post that is in the structure of corporate governance. This 
study on the application of IFRS in the foregoing is as Barth et al. (2008), Lang et 
al. (2003), Capkun et al. (2011), Zéghal et al. (2011), Marra et al. (2011), Daske et 
al. (2008) and Doukakis (2014) only using before and after application of IFRS 
category to measure the application of IFRS. This study uses three levels of 
application of IFRS, one that has not been applied, partly applied and completely 
applied the IFRS. The use of these three levels of application of IFRS is expected to 
provide the contribution of methodology due to the difference of application of IFRS 
among countries in the period 2002-2013.  
 
Practical contribution is expected to be in the form of policy that may improve the 
roles of corporate governance in the period of application of IFRS such providing 
empirical evidence on the impact of application of IFRS, that the policy will be     
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taken is in the form of guidance or standards that may minimizes the occurrence of 
accrual earnings management. Providing the evidence of empirical on the roles of 
auditor quality in minimizing the occurrence of accrual earnings management. 
 
The difference of this study with the previous studies is that this study uses 
companies’ samples from countries using corporate governance two-tier model.  
Study on the application of IFRS that is performed by using the companies’ sample 
in many countries using control variable in the form of earnings management index 
per country, stock capitalism, ownership concentration, disclosure index, legal 
origin, corruption index and law regulation such as performed by Ahmed et al. 
(2012) and Christensen et al. (2008). This study uses companies from five countries 
that categorized based on the cluster used in the research of Leuz (2003). Leuz 
(2003) classifies country based on total earnings management index, stock 
capitalization, ownership concentration, disclosure index, legal origin, and 
corruption index as well as law regulation.  
  
Literature Review 
 
Anderson (2004) states that in the mechanism of corporate governance 
commissioner council is an important internal control mechanism. The stockholder 
delegates responsibility to the commissioner to make decision in the name of them, 
including the assignment to monitoring the behavior of management. Member of 
commissioner council must have level of high skill and have strong professional 
reputation. Member of independent commissioner council is expected to reduce 
agency issues that is in top management with the skill and professional possessed.  
 
According to Ooghe and De Langhe (2002) there is clear cut characteristic between 
corporate governance models such as Anglo American model and Euro Continental 
model. The first difference is in Anglo American company has concentration of low 
stockholder, while in Euro Continental concentration of ownership by company’s 
group large enough from the amount of circulated stock. According to Hubert and 
De Langhe (2002) generally company in Germany, France, Italia, and The 
Netherland have concentration of ownership above 50% with the proportion of the 
amount company registered in Stock Exchange lesser compared to the proportion of 
the amount of Anglo American company registered in Stock Exchange.  
 
The second difference is there is identity different of stockholder. Ooghe and De 
Langhe (2002) indicate that in 1994 Anglo American company that represents the 
ownership of company’s stock to the finance institution that acts as agent more than 
50% compared to the one represented its stock to individual which only about 
between 20-30%. The characteristic country that follows European Company which 
represented by Germany, Italia, and France is the fact that its stock ownership hold 
by the private company is between 20-40%, by financial institutions between 10-
30% and by individuals between 15-30%.  
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The third difference is the amount of total company registered in Stock Exchange 
compared to the one that is not registered. In the Euro Continental Company the 
amount of company registered in stock exchange lesser than the amount of company 
that is in the Euro Continental. Investment of stock performed by individual directly 
to private company so that personal relationship between investor and management 
party tied strongly. This is different than Anglo American Company, as example 
system of pension leads to the availability of many funding resources that may be 
invested in Stock Exchange through financial institution (Miller and Choi, 2014).   
 
The fourth difference is higher blockholding in the company of follower country of 
Euro Continental model with the company in Anglo American Country. This leads 
to high strong vote of stakeholder in euro Continental compared to in Anglo 
American. In the company of the follower of Euro Continental model conflict may 
occur between majority stakeholder and minority stakeholder. It different than the 
company of Anglo American that more transparent with strong regulation that limits 
conflict of ownership in the company. 
 
Schipper (1989) states that earnings management is a deliberate action covers all 
kinds of manipulations that may affect financial reporting both through the amount 
of profit or other accounting item and may suits to or not suits to the standards. 
According to Babalyan (2004) earnings management motivation is not only a matter 
of bonus plan, debt covenant, or political cost but it is a result of manager motivation 
as well to maximize their own utility (Macijauskas and Maditinos, 2014). 
Maximization of manager utility is not always considered narrowly as remuneration 
maximization and wealth. But the intention is to meet the utilization function such as 
warranty job and self-respect. This occurs due to main motivation which so difficult 
to be measured. If the managers is respected due to their performance in the form of 
accounting profit, manager will make any effort to increase company’s profit that 
will lead to the improvement of bonus or reward through selection of certain method 
or procedure.   
 
Schipper (2005) indicates company that adopts IFRS is less involve in earnings 
management and more punctual in acknowledging damage. Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), Paananen and Lin (2009) perform research on discretionary 
accrual in German company that adopts IFRS find company that implements IFRS 
has larger discretionary accrual also there is a low correlation between accrual and 
cash flow. Pursuant to EC regulation No 1606/2002 registered public company in 
Europe since 2005, has mandatory to compile a financial reporting in accordance 
with IFRS designed by International Accounting Standard Board. The purpose of the 
compilation of this standard is to increase comparability of financial reporting, 
improve company transparency and to improve the quality of financial reporting so 
that may provide more beneficial information to the investors as well to improve the 
function of financial market. Manager that performs earnings management by 
increasing profit nowadays by performing the accrual reversal action in the next 
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period may encourage future profit down proportionally by the increase of profit 
currently.   
 
Zéghal et al. (2011) investigates the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption, corporate 
governance mechanism on earnings management. Sample used is 353 companies in 
France in 2003–2006. Zéghal et al. (2011) measures the earnings management by 
using discretionary accrual model used by Kothari  et al. (2005). The result of the 
research of Zéghal et al. (2011) indicates if IFRS and corporate governance 
mechanism has influence on the decreasing of earnings management in Paris. 
 
Manager is motivated by reputation and contracting to increase the company value. 
This encourages the creation of information to market due to the more information 
disclosed will decrease attention of investor on adverse selection. Information 
creation to the stock market may improve investor’s trust toward company and leads 
to the increasing of stock market price. Opposite condition occurred if manager 
unable to increase the value of company that its company will become subject of 
takeover that leads to the manager’s replacement. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
state that the disclosure of voluntary decreases asymetric information between 
company and market.  
 
According to IFRS 13 proper value is accepted price on assets selling or payment to 
transfer liability in transaction between interested parties on the date of 
measurement. IFRS 13 term requires an entity to disclose information on value 
techniques and inputs used to measure proper value although information on 
uncertain condition that covers the measurement of proper value. Input used as basic 
of determination of proper value consists of three levels, as follows level 1: input of 
adopted price from active market for identical assets and liabilities. These prices 
must be used as determination input of proper value without adjustment, in so far 
available. Level 2: inclusive at level 1, observable input, indirectly or indirectly on 
assets and liabilities Level 3: unobserved input, including internal data of company, 
necessarily adjusted to reflect assumptions on the participant at the market. IASB in 
2009 provided reduction on requirement level of proper value usage that allows 
certain financial instrument that will be full reclassified from proper value that is 
issued by FASB. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Klein (2002) finds negative relationship between independent commissioner 
measurements with earnings management activity. The study of Klein (2002) 
describes there is no relationship between audit committee which only consists of 
one independent member with abnormal accrual, but there is negative relationship 
between audit committee amount with abnormal accrual. Klein (2002) states there is 
earnings management negative relationship with commissioner board amount that is 
more derives from external of company, compared to the amount of commissioner 
boards derives from external of company. 
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Larcker et al. (2007) examines the relationship between typical measurement of 
corporate governance and various accounting output and economics that are not 
come from one consistency set. Larcker et al. (2007) indicates positive between 
accrual discretionary and commissioner board measurement but there is negative 
relationship between absolute value of accrual and commissioner board 
measurement, while the issues of company management may occurred in relation to 
how large the member of commissioner board is. They also find abnormal accrual 
association that has relationship with accounting report that may describe the future 
performance with abnormal return stock. 
 
Chtourou and Courteau (2001) study on the influence of company’s corporate 
governance practices on financial reporting quality that is published to public. This 
study studies the relationship between audit committee characteristic and 
commissioner board with company’s earnings management level that is measured by 
positive and negative discretionary accrual levels. Using two US companies set, one 
with discretionary accrual which is found relatively high and low if earnings 
management significantly related to corporate governance practice.  
 
Study result of Rahman and Ali (2006) proves the contradictive with the study of 
Klein (2002), Anderson et al. (2004), Zéghal et al. (2011). According to Rahman 
and Ali (2006), the big commissioner board size will lead to the process of making 
decision becomes difficult. Rahman and Ali (2006) state that company with big 
amount of commissioner may trigger interest conflict that may constrain the 
monitoring the performance of company by commissioner board. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) state that there is roles of commissioner board in improving the performance 
of company and improving financial information quality. Klein (2002), Anderson et 
al. (2004) and Zéghal et al. (2011) perform study that examines relationship between 
corporate governance with earnings management. Their study result indicates that 
there is negative relationship between the sizes of independent commissioner with 
earnings management activity.  
 
The study result of Cohen et al. (2012) indicates the change of manager’s behavior 
that performs accrual profit to be real earnings management after Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX). Mechanism function of corporate governance in the company is 
providing more supervision toward management performance as well as providing 
accurate information and precision on the financial reporting of company.  Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) describe that commissioner board as an 
important mechanism in the structure of corporate governance. Their argumentation 
is the existence of commissioner board is a form of an effective monitoring depends 
on its composition. 
 
Anderson et al. (2004) describes that the commissioner board size is an indicator to 
measure the monitoring and the role of advisor, that both may contributed to 
understand the behavior of management Larcker et al. (2007) indicates there is 
positive relationship between discretionary accrual with the commissioner board, but  
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there is negative relationship between absolute value of accrual with the size of 
commissioner board. Based on that hypothesis raised is: 
 
H1:  IFRS implementation strengthen the negative relationship between independent 
commissioner proportion toward commissioner board with accrual earnings 
management.  
 
The exploration on corporate governance that performed by Carcello et al. (2006) 
indicates that important role and unique of chairperson of the risk committee, 
chairperson of the compliance committee, chairperson of the ethics committee. 
Apart from that there is other important role in the corporate governance scope that 
is the position of chairperson of commissioner board, chairperson of the board of 
directors and chairperson of other committees. In line with SOX regulations of 2002, 
therefore regulation that regulates the existence of independent audit committee and 
financial expert is mandatory required by the regulators in many countries. 
Generally the regulation of corporate governance regulates on independency of 
commissioner board member with available committee in that commissioner board. 
The role of an audit committee is very important in conducting responsibility to 
present supervision report related to the credibility of financial reporting, audit and 
corporate governance entirely for commissioner board. The existence of audit 
committee in the company may provide more supervision on the performance of 
management and provide accurate information and exact on financial reporting of 
company. If a person is an audit committee member that has important responsibility 
to monitoring and assist on improvement of financial reporting credibility provided 
double post, both recruited company and other post in other company. If that audit 
committee member conducts double post then it is suspected to be a cause of 
decreasing of the performance of that audit committee member. 
  
H2: IFRS implementation strengthen the negative relationship between audit 
committee member with accrual earnings management.  
 
Method  of Study 
 
Here is shown the research model used.  
 
Figure 1. Model of Analysis of IFRS Implementation as Moderating Variabel of 
Relationship of Corporate Governance with Earnings Management 
 
 
 
 
IFRS Implementation 
 
Earnings Management 
Corporate Governance 
• Commissioner Board 
• Audit Committee 
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The above scheme is describing the relationship between corporate governance 
variable and quality of auditor that is moderated by the implementing IFRS toward 
earnings management. The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on 
the analysis of implementing IFRS that moderates the relationship of corporate 
governance and the quality of auditor with earnings management. Corporate 
governance represented by two variables such as commissioner board and committee 
audit. Commissioner board is proxied by independent commissioner proportion 
toward commissioner board, while audit committee is proxied with double position 
of audit committee member with other position in sample company or other 
company. 
Financial reporting data obtained from BVD OSIRIS database provided by FEB 
UGM taken on 01 March 2014. Other data obtained is from website of company and 
website of Stock Exchange of the state involved. Data used originally from the 
period of 2001-2013. Data of 2001 used to meet the calculation of variable that 
needs lag-1 data. Period of years of observation are 2002, 2003, and 2004 (three 
years) prior to IFRS implementation and year of 2006-2013 (eight years) for the 
period after IFRS implementation.    
 
Manufacturing company is chosen as the model of earnings management calculation 
that uses the model component of stay depreciated in accordance with the modified 
Jones model used. This study is using proxy of commissioner board size by using 
proportion the amount of independent commissioner member toward the amount of 
commissioner board.  
 
Audit committee is proxied with 1 if there is audit committee member of i company 
at period t perform double position with other position or in other company as an 
executive or commissioner board or other committee. Double position as other 
committee in the same company the code is 1. Double position as an executive in 
other company the code is 1. Double position as commissioner in other company the 
code is 1. If there is no double position the point is 0. Audit quality as control 
variable the code is 1 if it is and industrial specialist auditor and 0 if non-industrial 
specialist auditor. IFRS implementation level of implementing IFRS, the code is 0 
for local accounting standards implementation, or accounting standards using US 
GAAP, the code is 0 for non-implementing, code 1 is for partly implementing IFRS, 
and code 2 for full implementing IFRS.  
 
This study uses two moderating variables as its independent that is moderated 
commissioner board with IFRS implementation, moderated audit committee with 
IFRS implementation. Apart from that four control variables are used as other 
independent variable that is company size using total assets which is proxied by 
natural log of assets, proxied profitability of company with return on assets (ROA), 
the difficulty of proxied financial with gearing ratio, and auditor external with 
Industrial specialist auditor. Dependent variable of earnings management in this 
study is using proxy is accrual earnings management.  
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Furthermore, for the accrual income management proxy used from Jones Modified 
Model (Dechow, 1995) and the model for this research are: 
 
DAit =   β0 + β1Boardit + β2IFRSit+ β3ACit+ β4AUDit+ β5ROAit + β6SIZEit + β7LEVit+  
             β8Board*IFRSit  + β9AC*IFRSit + εit  
 
With the following explanation: 
DAit: Discretionary accrual of  i company in t period. 
Board:it Proportion of independent commissioner toward commissioner 
board in i company in t period.  
IFRSit: Level of implementing IFRS with 0 code for local accounting 
standard implementation, or accounting standards using US 
GAAP, code 1 for implementing partly IFRS, code 2 is for 
implementing full IFRS. 
AUD it:  Auditor spesialis industri pada perusahaan i pada periode t. 
ACit: Audit committee member that performs multi position with other 
Committee in commissioner board in i company or in other 
company in t period. 
ROAit: Return on assets in t year, calculated from operating revenue 
divided by total assets in i company in t period. 
SIZEit: Natural logarithm of total assets in i company in t period. 
LEVit: Total debt divided by total assets in i company in t period. 
Boardit*IFRSit: Proportion of independent commissioner toward commissioner 
board in i company in t period interacted with variable of 
implementing IFRS. 
ACit*IFRSit: Audit committee member that performs double position with 
other committee in commissioner board in i company or in other 
company in t period interacted with variable of implementing 
IFRS. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Procedure of sample selection is shown in Table 1 sample obtained is 555 
companies registered in Stock Exchange of Germany, France, The Netherland, 
Denmark with year of observation for as long as 13 years, so that total observation 
obtained is 7.215 observations. Process of outlier is performed if the sample has 
value beyond average of 3 times of deviation standard for respective study variable 
as follows Table 1 which describes the procedure of sample selection.   
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Table 1. Procedure of Sample Selection 
Companies manufacturing code 31, 32, 33 (NAICS 2007 ) 555 
Sample of 2001-2013 (13 years) 7.215 
Cancelled object of observed sample of 2001 due to turns to be basic 
year for lag t-1,of 2005 as IFRS begins mandatory implemented 
(1.110) 
Number of initial sample prior to deduction unavailable data  6.105 
Unavailable data  (3.161) 
Available data 2.944 
Outlier in calculation model of regression discretionary accruals  (1.475) 
Total of study sample 1.469 
Note: This table describes the sample selection procedure based on the completeness of the 
existing data according to the NAICS 2007 manufacturing code 31-33 with the 2001-2013 
years of observation with some specified criteria.  
 
The sample countries whose companies have voluntarily applied IFRS before 2005 
are France at 2.5%. On the initial application of IFRS voluntarily Christensen et al. 
(2009) states that there are incentives for companies that voluntarily adopt IFRS that 
will not be granted if IFRS is required in the EU. The average value of the 
proportion of independent commissioners to the board of commissioners for a 
sample of firms listed on the German, French, Dutch and Danish stock exchanges of 
0.285. 
 
There is a difference in the level of accrual management of firms listed on the 
German Stock Exchange prior to the IFRS implementation of the 2002-2004 period 
and after the application of IFRS for the period 2006-2013. Different test results for 
firms listed on the German, Danish, French and Dutch Stock Exchanges show the 
difference between accrual earnings management before and after IFRS 
implementation. Companies listed on the French Stock Exchange show no 
difference between the accrual profit management before and after the application of 
IFRS. 
 
On average earnings management on respective samples are never zero but indicates 
direction positive or negative. This indicates that earnings is managed to fluctuate, 
here is descriptive statistic presented from accrual earnings management that divided 
to three categories such as total earnings, positive, and negative managements. 
Accrual earnings 2002-2003 for registered companies in Stock Exchange of 
Germany, France, Denmark, The Netherland. There are different levels of earnings 
management before and after IFRS implementation on firms listed on the German 
Stock Exchange, and the Netherlands.  
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Table 2.  Model Acrual Earnings Management 
Model  
DAit = β0+β1Boardit+β2ACit +β3 IFRSit+β4AUDit +β5 ROAit+β6SIZEit+β7LEVit +    
           β8Board*IFRSit+β9AC*IFRSit +εit                  
 
Variable Dependent:  Disretionary accrual (DA) 
Variable Independent  Exp. Sign Coefficient 
IFRS1               
Coefficient 
IFRS2 
Intercept ? ***-0,090  ***-0,029 
commissioner boards (BOARD) - ** 0,011  0,018 
Audit Committee (AC) - **-0,013  **-0,041 
Auditor Quality (AUD) - ***-0,022  -0,105 
IFRS - ***-0,046  ***0,051 
ROA - ***-0,010  **0,001 
SIZE - **0,004  **-0,011 
LEVERAGE + ***0,016  ***0,016 
BOARD*IFRS - -0,004  -0,005 
AC*IFRS - *-0,003  *-0,004 
Prob(F-Statistic)                                               0,00                       0,000 
Adjusted`R-squared                                               0,19                       0,202 
*** Significant at level  1% 
**   Significant at level  5% 
*     Significant at level  10% 
Notes:  
This tabel discribe estimate acrual model of earnings management registered companies in 
Stock Exchange of Germany, France, Denmark, The Netherland. Variable dependent: 
disretionary accrual (DA); variable independent: Board of comisioner (Board), audit 
committe (AC), level of implementation IFRS (IFRS); moderating variable: 
BOARD*IFRS, AC*IFRS; variable control: ROA, size, dan leverage ( LEV) and auditor 
quality (AUD). 
 
Using moderated regression analysis model used constitutes one of moderating quasi 
as it is consists of main variable and moderating variable. Main variable is 
commissioner boards and audit committee. Moderating variable is moderated 
commissioner boards variable with degree of implementing IFRS.  
 
The increase of highest accrual earning management occurred in companies in The 
Netherland in 2004, further registered companies in France Stock Exchange as well 
in 2005. It is different than registered companies in German Stock Exchange which 
its highest magnitude accrual earnings management in 2003.  
 
Hypothesis 1 that states the implementation of IFRS strengthen the negative 
relationship between independent commissioner proportions toward number of 
commissioner boards with earnings management acceptable. Moderating variable of 
audit committee is moderated by the degree of implementation of IFRS. Direction of 
study which is predicted negative apparently has positive direction in examined 
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sample of implemented IFRS companies unable to strengthen the negative 
relationship between multiple position of audit committee member with earnings 
management. This study result is in line with study result of Marra et al. (2011) and 
Zéghal et al. (2011). 
 
Hypothesis 2 that states the implementation of IFRS weakens the negative 
relationship between multiple positions of audit committee member with earnings 
management is acceptable. The result of this study able to support the study result of 
Marra et at. (2011) and Zéghal et al. (2011). There is similarity of signs between 
predictions with the result of examination. This similarity indicates that although 
multiple position in audit committee occurred but mechanism of corporate 
governance particularly the role of audit committee may run well in reducing 
earnings management. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In general this study is aim to provide empirical study on analysis of implementing 
IFRS as moderating variable of corporate governance relationship with earnings 
management. In particular there are two objections in this study which the first one 
is to provide empirical study on analysis of implementing IFRS as moderating 
variable of the relationship between commissioner board with earnings management. 
Second objective is to analyze the implementation of IFRS as moderating variable of 
relationship between audit committee with earnings management.  
 
Several conclusions that may be drive from the result of examination in this study is 
as follows accrual earnings management model examination performed by samples 
of registered companies in Stock Exchange of Germany, France, The Netherland and 
Denmark. The result of the examination indicates the implementation of IFRS 
strengthen the negative relationship between proportion of independent 
commissioner toward number of commissioner boards with accrual earnings 
management so that Hypothesis 1 is acceptable. Hypothesis 2 that states the 
implementation of IFRS strengthens the negative relationship between multiple 
positions of audit committee member with accrual earnings management is 
acceptable. 
 
Limitations 
 
The constrains of this study among other things is the measurement of IFRS using 
ranking based on three ranks which are have not implementing yet, partly 
implementing, fully implementing. During the observation period from 2002-2013 
there has been many changing in implementing IFRS that marks with the 
implementation of IFRS standards gradually in many countries. Adaptation of local 
standard with IFRS standard with category that is used by the author containing bias. 
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This study uses various data source for operating cash flow reporting during 2001-
2004 the author takes from various data sources. The different of data source 
allowing the occurrence of bias due to the difference of currency in certain period. 
The study uses sample from several countries that implement IFRS and its 
comparison country. The author has isolated the difference from those five sample 
countries match to the characteristic of corporate governance two tier model and the 
grouping of Leuz (2003) define cluster which based on total earnings management 
index, stock capitalization, ownership concentration, disclosure index, legal origin, 
corruption index and law regulation in those four countries. The sample isolation 
mentioned in order that there is no differences of company characteristic and sample 
country characteristic that may influence the result of study. 
 
Implications 
 
This study is expected to provide implication of study methodology as follows: first 
to develop the size of implementation of IFRS by using comparison of 
implementation per standard accounting of applicable IFRS in other countries and 
second a further study may use other earnings management size that is more 
powerful by considering the type of industrial characteristics. The implementation of 
IFRS is proven to moderate the role of commissioner boards and audit committees 
toward accrual earnings management.  
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